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Prior  to  embarking  on  this  discussion  of  European  responses  to  gangs,  it  is 
imperative to set out the parameters and scope of this chapter. It is unconceivable 
within the confines of this chapter to provide an in-depth analysis of each of the 28 
European Member States and their responses to gangs. Indeed in some instances 
such analysis would be unproductive, given that the ‘gang’ does not feature highly on 
the  political  and  policy  agendas.  Rather,  we  will  endeavour  to  provide  a  broad 
overview of European gang discourse, knowledge, interventions and current policy 
direction via a miscellany of countries, including Western Europe countries involved 
in the ITACA Projecti (Interaction of different subjects Towards A strategic Common 
Answer concerning juvenile gangs), the Netherlands, and Scandinavia. In order to 
set European gang policies and interventions in context, we briefly reflect on the 
dialogue around definitions, with a particular focus on the problem of translation. Our 
task of generically discussing gang responses across Europe is hindered by the fact 
that, at the time of writing, there exists no commonly accepted definition of ‘youth 
gangs’ or ‘juvenile gangs’ (or even of what constitutes ‘juvenile delinquency’) within 
the EU. During the course of this chapter, we endeavour to illustrate how, the gang 
phenomenon may be described in various ways between European countries, while 
indeed other European countries may not directly address ‘gangs’ at all. To this end 
societal and criminal justice system differences within Europe are significant when it 
comes to  understanding responses to  gangs.   Finally,  we  attempt  to  provide an 
indication of the emerging evidence regarding the nature and extent of the European 
gang problem.  
Lost  in  Translation?  European  gang  discourse  and  continuing  definitional 
issues
As Klein et al. (2001: 3) note, until recently, there had been a “tendency to deny the 
existence of gangs in Europe because they do not fit the stereotype derived from the 
earlier studies”.  Hence, whilst many European countries have had youth groupings, 
which might be referred to as ‘street gangs’, ‘youth gangs’ or ‘juvenile gangs’ both 
academics and policy makers were often hesitant to call them ‘gangs’ because they 
compared their own groups to American stereotypes (see Covey 2003; Decker and 
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Weerman 2005).  Nevertheless, the resistance to the acceptance of a gang culture in 
Europe has shifted markedly over the last decade. Indeed, some might argue that 
the pendulum has swung the other way and there is now over-identification of the 
gang  (e.g.  among  police  and  policy  makers).  The  eminent  US  gang  researcher 
Ronald Huff (1990) has presented a compelling analysis of US reaction to gangs. He 
refers to a three-stage model of (1) Denial, followed by (2) Over-reaction and (3) 
Misidentification. As we document later in this chapter, in certain European countries 
we can see clear historical similarities in the fields of academia and policy.   Yet, 
whilst  there  has  been  a  marked  shift  around  the  acceptance  of  gangs  and 
accumulative discourse on gangs in Europe, certain issues still prevail, such as the 
reluctance in some quarters to use the term ‘gang’ and the perennial  problem of 
definition.  Research  in  the  Netherlands,  France,  Denmark  and  Sweden  highlight 
these difficulties. For instance, Van Gemert (2012) identifies the reluctance of the 
use  of  the  term ‘jeugdbendes’ in  the  Netherlands  to  describe  problematic  youth 
groups (jeugdbendes being the common equivalent of gangs). In a French context, it 
is argued that it would be more appropriate to describe the phenomenon of juvenile  
gangs as ‘bandes’ (not ‘gangs’), vocabulary with less of an emphasis on the serious 
and violent nature of youth gangs (see Cervantes and Marchand, 2013). Terminology 
also blurs the understanding amongst the Scandinavian countries where there are 
differences  between  the  meaning  of  the  words  gang  (gjeng),  which  is  used  in 
Norway (and Sweden), and bande, which is used in Denmark. Carlsson and Decker 
(2005: 267) note that the “Norwegian word gang has associations that might lead to  
a belittling or denial of the problem, whilst the Danish word bande can push people in 
the moral panic direction.” 
Different gang terms and meanings employed1 across 
Europe
Denmark Bande Gang
1  Terms employed in policy, by police, or via media/public discourse. 
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France Bande juveniles Juvenile band (groups of young people)
Bandes de jeunes Bands of youths
Italy Baby-gang
Bande minorili Juvenile band
Gang di bulli Gang of bullies
Bande di periferia Band of periphery
Bande giovanili Youth band
Street gang
Juvenile gangs
 
Germany Bande Gang
Kinderbande
Gang of children
Jugendbande Young gang
Norway Gjeng Gang/Thread/Bunch
Spain Juvenile gang
Juvenile violent group
Bands (in relation to Latin groups, such as the “Latin 
King” operating in Madrid)
Sweden Gjeng
UK Delinquent Youth Group
Troublesome Youth Group
Youth Gang
Urban Street Gang
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Leaving translation complications aside, the current European gang policy landscape 
is made more challenging by the difficulties of defining gangs and identifying their 
members and associates - a problem that has long since plagued gang research in 
the United States (see Decker and Kempf-Leonard 1991; Klein  et al. 2001). Many 
European countries that attest to having a gang problem and have developed policy 
and a range of responses to it do not have formal or even widely used definitions. 
Even within the UK, one of the least problematic countries in terms of translation, 
resistance  and  problems  around  definitional  agreement  are  evident  at  both  an 
academic and practice level.  Alexander (2000; 2008) has denounced the use of the 
term whilst Hallsworth and Young (2008) have warned against the upsurge in ‘gang 
talk’. Resistance and confusion is also evident when referring to the concept of the 
gang  amongst  criminal  justice  workers.   There  have  been  calls  from  some 
practitioners to replace the term gang with ‘delinquent youth groups’ (Youth Justice 
Board, 2007). A Joint Thematic Review in 2010 by the three HM Inspectorates of  
Prisons, Probation and Constabulary found that there was still  no agreed working 
definition  or  common  understanding  of  what  constituted  a  gang  amongst  those 
working  in  a  prison  setting  or  in  the  community  in  the  UK  (HMIPP  2010). 
Furthermore, when we drill down to the level of the individual and what constitutes a 
‘gang member’,  ‘gang associate’,  or  somebody who is  ‘gang affiliated’ or  on the 
‘periphery of gangs’ the picture is less clear (Smithson et al. 2012).
Moreover, a working definition of a gang does not exist in Sweden, Italy, France or  
Portugal. In describing the current situation in Italy for example, the ITACA project 
concluded that a clear definition of a gang does not exist in Italy, even if there are 
some policy actions in the field. The gang is still perceived as a journalistic term and 
the research reported en masse media amplification of the problem but it does not 
represent a real criminological category (Padovani et al. 2013). Portugal is similar in 
that neither the Portuguese juvenile justice system nor the Portuguese penal justice 
system  refers  to  the  specific  association  of  youths  to  groups  or  gangs.  The 
Portuguese  justice  system contains  no  official  criteria  for  a  young  person  to  be 
considered a gang member and the word ‘gang’ is rarely used by Portuguese people 
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(Matos et al. 2013).  Hence, there is a distinct absence of both academic research 
and official statistics on youth gangs in Portugal.  
Of those countries that have developed definitions, there is considerable variation. 
For example, in Spain, the official definition of ‘juvenile gangs’ or ‘juvenile violent  
groups’ is, “Those composed of minors and young people aged from 14 to 30 years 
old, presenting cohesion and internal discipline structures and whose actions result 
in behaviours sometimes violent, generating social alarm” (Pozo et al. 2013: 140).  In 
Norway, the Oslo Police Department’s gang definition is:
“A  group  (often  limited  in  age)  staying  together  over  a  period  of  time, 
performing  criminal  acts  and/or  disturbing  public  order  and  showing 
aggressive behaviour in public places. The gang has some kind of symbolic 
expression  of  their  group  participation  such  as  name,  insignia,  clothing, 
language etc.” (Jensen and Stubberud, 2011: 268). 
Definitions in the Netherlands have mainly developed in The Hague region of the 
country since the mid-1990s, with a ‘jeugdbende’, the Dutch word for ‘gang’ originally 
described as: 
 “A group of three or more youth, that are connected because of race, country 
of  origin,  culture or  territory,  that  meet  regularly and (among other  things) 
have the goal to commit criminal activities” (Van Osterwijk et al., 1995: 44).  
Although this original definition has since been altered and added to by the police. 
Within  Denmark,  the  focus  has  been  on  biker  gangs  and  organized  crime  as 
opposed to the emphasis on youth groups and street gangs of some its European 
counterparts. The legal definition of organized crime in Denmark is taken from the 
EU definition of which there are 11 components, with four being obligatory: 
“Collaboration of more than two people; for a prolonged or indefinite period of 
time; suspected of the commission of serious criminal offences and motivated 
by the pursuit of profit and/or power” (European Union, 1997).   
Definitions in the UK have developed since 2002, the first ‘official’ definition offered 
by the Home Office Report 'Shooting, Gangs and Violent Incidences in Manchester' 
(Bullock and Tilley 2002) defined a gang as: "Enduring groups of young people who 
see themselves as members of those groups and who commit crime as part of that 
membership”. By 2009, the UK Gangs Working Group attempted to apply a universal 
definition to be adopted by all those tackling gangs to end terminology confusion and 
allow comparative analysis between different studies. The group defined gangs as: 
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“A relatively durable, predominately street-based group of young people who 
(1)  see  themselves  (and  are  seen  by  others)  as  a  discernible  group,  (2)  
engage in a range of criminal activity and violence, (3) identify with or lay 
claim over territory, (4) have some form of identifying structural feature and (5) 
are in conflict with other, similar gangs” (Centre for Social Justice, 2009: 21). 
The current  Coalition  Government  has persisted in  adopting  the  Gangs Working 
Group’s five-point definition (EGYV, 2011).
To this end, the ‘Eurogang definition’ has been praised, if not necessarily as the most 
conceptually suitable definition of a gang, for the attempt it represents to provide 
researchers  with  a  consistent  starting  point  in  identifying,  measuring  and 
characterising youth gangs across Europe (Wood and Alleyne, 2010).   Moreover, 
given  the  Eurogang  commitment  to  developing  a  common  framework  for 
comparative international research, the construction of a consensus definition in the 
context  of  such  diverse  available  definitions  and  approaches  is  critical.  The 
Eurogang  Network  defines  a  street  gang  as,  “Any  durable  street-oriented  youth 
group whose involvement in illegal activity is part of their group identity” (Klein and 
Maxson, 2006: 4).  
The extent of gangs in Europe
Prior to discussing gang policy direction, we reflect here on what we actually know of 
the extent of the gang problem within Europe as well as how such knowledge has 
formed.   Across  Europe,  gang  estimates  are  predominately  derived  from  police 
intelligence sources. These measures have historically been problematized in the 
US gang literature. Zatz (1987) for instance, found that the Phoenix Arizona police 
department  exaggerated  the  seriousness  of  the  gang  problem  by  raising  the 
estimates of the gang problem from five to more than 100 distinct gangs within a 
two-year period, consequently leading to further police funding. More recently, Webb 
and Katz (2003) warned those using police gang databases to look at gang-related 
phenomena to think carefully about the nature and reliability of the data, in light of 
the fact that counting rules were so ‘flagrantly disregarded’. In an age of austerity 
including staffing and funding cuts, the ‘talking up’ of the gang problem by police 
forces is one tactic of ensuring funding and resources in times of economic hardship 
(see Smithson et al. 2013).  
In addition to police department figures that are often generated at a city or regional  
level, some attempts at national estimates have emerged in countries such as the 
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England and Wales, the Netherlands, France, Spain and Sweden. In England and 
Wales, the figures are confusing; in 2004, Bennett and Holloway used arrestee data 
to estimate that there are 20,000 gang members. However, they note that this figure 
may vary by ‘up to 5,000 either way.’ In 2009, using figures derived from the 2004/05 
Offending Crime and Justice Survey (see Sharp et al., 2006), the Centre for Social 
Justice stated, “up to 6% of 10-19 year olds self-report as belonging to a delinquent  
youth group” (Centre for Social Justice, 2009: 1). We can compare this to the US, 
where 8% of those between ages 10 and 23 have a history of gang membership 
(see Pyrooz, 2014).  If  we take the Centre for Social  Justice percentages above, 
based on 7.5million people aged between ten and 19, it would equate to 467,000 
gang members. However,  the same report  concludes that  there are over 50,000 
gang members in England and Wales (Centre for Social  Justice, 2009:  19).  The 
reasons for the discrepancy with the UK figures can be explained by terminology, the 
Offending Crime and Justice Survey speaks of ‘delinquent youth groups’, whilst the 
Centre for Social Justice fails to make any distinction between active and inactive 
gang members.       
The scale, size and make-up of gang problems also vary. Figures recently compiled 
in  Sweden,  suggest  that  5,000 young people under  the age of  21 make up the 
recruitment base for gangs (see Lindström 2010). Whilst in the Netherlands, national 
figures published in 2010, report 1,154 ‘youth groups’, with only six of these defined 
as ‘jeugdbendes’. Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Utrecht and the Hague report having no 
‘jeugdbendes’ but 7, 3, 19 and 11 criminal youth groups respectively (Ferwerda and 
Van Ham 2010 cited in Van Gemert 2012). Van Burik et al.’s (2013) analysis of the 
Dutch situation found that  whilst  the term ‘youth’ was often used,  almost  a  third 
(31%) of those identified as belonging to ‘criminal youth groups’ were older.  More in-
depth analysis of 10 criminal youth groups found that the groups differ greatly in size 
from large (approximately 100 members) to small (eight members). Some groups 
were found to primarily contain young members, while others consisted mainly of 
those aged 23 or older. Around half of the groups consisted largely or exclusively of  
members  from  Moroccan  Dutch  origin.  The  nature  of  criminal  involvement  was 
viewed as ‘severe  to  very severe’ in  all  groups,  with  at  least  half  of  the groups 
involved in possession of weapons, (severe) violent crime and drug trafficking. 
It remains uncertain as to whether gangs are still on the ascendancy across Europe 
or whether recent gang policy is having an effect.  Van Burik et al.’s analysis of Dutch 
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national reports identified that the number of problematic youth groups had declined 
in recent years. There was a decrease of 13% in 2011 and a decrease of 23% in  
2012. However, as they note, this does not conclusively show that there is actually 
less problematic youth groups.  For  example, more expertise may result  in better 
identification and hence the number of problematic youth groups may decrease, as 
fewer groups are misidentified. The Dutch report suggests that the decrease has 
been  greatest  amongst  the  least  problematic  youth  groupings  whilst  the  more 
criminal youth groups showed the least clear evidence of decline. Within Spain, there 
are reportedly three different  types of gangs, the extreme right,  extreme left  and 
Latin “bands” (i.e. groups). Numbers of youth identified as gang members, amounts 
to a total of 11,465 in 2006 and 15,665 in 2007, a significant increase over two years  
(Pozo et al. 2013).   French figures illustrate a rise in numbers from 2009 to 2011, 
with 222 gangs involving 2,500 individuals in 2009, increasing to 313 gangs in 2011 
(Cervantes and Marchand  2013). 
In other countries, such as Italy and Portugal, figures relating to gangs and gang 
membership simply do not exist. In the case of Portugal, the ITACA study suggests 
that although there are no criteria in the Portuguese justice system to register gangs’ 
activity, it is possible to establish if three or more youths were involved in the same 
crime  (following  the  same  criteria  used  in  the  Internal  Security  Annual  Report). 
According  to  these  statistics,  40  lawsuits  were  registered  in  2010,  with  the 
involvement of three or more youths. This number increased to 78 in 2011 (Matos et 
al. 2013). One might interpret these figures as indication of a rise in ‘juvenile gang’ 
activity  although  practitioner  opinion  remains  divided.  In  the  ITACA  survey  of 
Portuguese  practitioners  who  work  with  youngsters  with  or  at  risk  of  delinquent 
behaviour, less than half (46.5%) expressed ‘no doubt’ about the existence of youth 
gangs in Portugal (Matos et al. 2013).
In summary, in trying to encapsulate the current gang situation in Europe, we can 
see that the ‘gang’ has clearly permeated legislation and practice in some countries 
far more than others and hence the existing knowledge base is unbalanced. When 
translation  complications  and  variations  in  gang  forms  (such  as  biker  gangs, 
extremist gangs and juvenile gangs) are added to the mix, the task of making sense 
of  the  situation  is  hampered further.   We now turn  to  academic  research in  an 
attempt to further piece together the European gang picture. 
What are we talking about when discussing ‘gangs’ in Europe?
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Alongside this somewhat patchy, variable and unreliable official data, there has been 
a significant growth in academic gang research in Europe. However, whilst European 
gang  research  is  a  growth  area,  with  amongst  others,  the  United  Kingdom, 
experiencing heightened academic, policy and practitioner interest in gangs, there is 
still a lack of academic research in many countries, and Europe is still playing catch-
up in comparison to the US. The dearth of knowledge is partly attributable to the fact 
that some academics continue to be critical of the concept of the gang and a sense 
of resistance or denial of ‘real gangs’ or ‘American street gangs’ still lingers in many 
European countries (see for example, Alexander, 2000; 2008). UK academics such 
as Pitts (2012) and Densley (2013), have engaged with the existence of gangs and 
as Densley notes in his recent monograph of an ethnographic study of gangs in 
London – How Gangs Work, “I found the gangs Britain denied existed” (2013: 176). 
He goes onto provide a framework for prevention and intervention.   
Here we ponder the question, ‘are US style street gangs emerging in Europe or are 
gangs distinctive to the European countries they are located in?’ Academic research 
suggests  that  within  Europe,  the  composition  and  purpose  of  gangs  differs.  In 
Denmark and Sweden, the traditional concern in discussion of gangs has centered 
on biker gangs. This is culturally distinct from Western Europe, where within the UK 
and  the  Netherlands  for  example,  the  biker  gangs  found  in  the  Scandinavian 
countries, cause little or no concern, instead there is a significant emphasis on the 
activity of young people and their role in gangs. However, there are clear signs that  
gang concerns are changing in Scandinavian countries. In Denmark, since the late 
1990s,  larger  groups  of  youths  and  young  adults,  primarily  from  immigrant 
backgrounds, have been linked to a range of crimes such as violent crime, extortion 
of protection monies, bank robbery, and sex, drugs and weapons offences (Cornils 
and Grave, 2004). These street gangs and their relationship to the biker gangs have 
received increased police attention (Rigspolitichefen, 2000).  More recently, Rostami 
and Leinfelt (2012) described how by the late 2000s organized and criminal ‘street 
gangs’ had begun to emerge and replace biker gangs as the catalyst for much of 
Sweden’s law enforcement response to gangs.  Continuing the move away from a 
primary  focus  on  biker  gangs,  Jensen  and  Stubberud  (2012)  categorise  gang 
structures in Oslo, as divided into three types: ad-hoc gangs, ethnic minority gangs 
and motorcycle gangs. In other parts of Europe, there is a distinct political dimension 
to the gang, such as the right wing youth groups in Germany (Kersten, 2001), and 
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the racist and neo-nazi groups found in Scandinavia (Carlsson and Decker 2005). As 
Hagedorn (2001: 48) observes, “Gangs in the United States have always been more 
alienated and survival focused rather than political”.  If we take the above findings 
and transmit it to Maxson and Klein’s (1995) instructive gang typology, it suggests 
that  some of  the  Scandinavian  countries  may have  Traditional  or  Neotraditional 
Gangs (biker gangs), whilst the focus on delinquent youth groups in the UK and the  
Netherlands  could  reflect  Collective  Gangs.  We  now  turn  to  a  consideration  of 
European developments in gang policy.
European gang policy 
Prior to embarking on a description of Europe’s response to gangs, it is useful to 
provide an overview of  differing European juvenile  justice systems.  An outline of 
these contexts will  assist  in an understanding of the development of  gang policy 
across Europe. Of significant importance is the observation that the age of criminal  
responsibility (the age at which a child can enter the criminal justice system) differs 
across Europe. For example: 
• Portugal – 16 years old 
• Belgium - 18 years old
• Finland - 15  years old 
• France - 13 years old
• Netherlands - 12 years old
• Italy – 14 years old
In each of the Scandinavian countries, it is 15, and adolescents under 18 years of 
age are subject to a system of justice that is geared mostly towards social services,  
with incarceration as the last resort (The Council of Europe Annual Penal Statistics).  
In the US, the age of criminal  responsibility is established by state law. Only 13 
states have set  minimum ages,  which range from six to  12.  Most  states rely on 
common  law,  which  holds  that  from  age  seven  to  age  14  children  cannot  be 
presumed to bear responsibility but nevertheless can be held responsible.      
International juvenile justice systems have generally been characterised by welfare 
and justice approaches. According to Junger-Tas (2006), there are three systems at 
play across Europe: 
(i) the Anglo-Saxon approach (England and Wales, USA, Canada and Netherlands) – 
characterised by a focus on accountability, punishment and deterrence.
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(ii)  the Continental approach (France, Belgium, Germany, Spain, Greece and Poland) – 
characterised by a focus on welfare, diversion and reparation.
(iii) the Nordic, Scottish and Scandinavian approaches (Scotland, Sweden, Finland, 
Denmark and Norway) – characterised by a focus on welfare, diversion, offender 
focused, social intervention.              
Irrespective of Europe’s differing juvenile justice systems, it is interesting to see that 
with respect to gang policy and interventions, the US is often turned to for direction.  
As we go on to outline below, in the last decade, as gang discourse and European 
gang  research  has  grown  exponentially,  so  too  have  the  responses  from 
practitioners  and  policy makers.  As we  highlight,  these responses  are  invariably 
influenced  by  existing  US  practices.  It  is  noteworthy  that  US  practices  are  so 
influential given that the majority of European countries detailed in this chapter, are 
characterised by welfare oriented youth justice systems. With this in mind, we begin 
this  section  with  a  caveat.  If  Europe is  looking  to  America  for  answers,  caution 
should prevail; although the US has implemented various guises of gang policy for 
the  last  thirty  years,  academics  still  challenge  its  usefulness  and  credibility.  For 
instance,  Bjerregarrd  (2003)  examined  anti-gang  legislation  across  the  US  and 
argued for  improved definitions,  legislation governing  gangs,  and gang members 
(see her updated review in Chapter 20). The lack of and robustness of evaluations of  
these gang interventions is an issue that has plagued American gang responses. For  
example,  a  recent  article  by  Gravel  et.  al (2013)  found  Spergel’s  (1995) 
Comprehensive Gang Model, to be ineffective due to problems with implementation 
fidelity  (see  Gebo  and  colleagues  review  of  the  CGM  in  Chapter  22).  In  their 
assessment of six major US gang control programmes, Klein and Maxson (2006) 
bemoan their failure as a direct result of weak or non-existent research designs and 
a lack of sustainable evaluations. These were all multimillion-dollar, large, national 
programmes.  We should point  out  that  although we advise caution,  examples of 
success can be found in chapters 18 and 21 of this text (the Focused Deterrence 
Strategy and the GREAT Programme), that said we remain cautious of ‘quick fixes’ 
and endorse the need for robust evaluations.        
So, has Europe fared any better? As we have described above,  European gang 
research whilst steadily increasing is still some way behind the US and subsequently 
so is the evidence base around effective European policy responses.  As we will 
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outline here, the paucity of empirical evaluation is omnipresent when one considers 
European responses to gangs. That said, some attempts have been made to assess 
impact.  A recent case in point is the 2013 Dutch report by van Burik and colleagues.  
This report provides a useful overview of what is currently in place to tackle 'criminal  
youth  groups'  in  the  Netherlands  –  the  Dutch  Action  Programme.  The  authors 
present a diverse picture and a somewhat patchy and inconsistent set of responses, 
dependent on the city. The study identifies 10 ‘developed approaches’ which ranged 
from pragmatic  and repressive policing practices through to  more  welfare,  multi-
agency approaches. They found that a majority of the approaches strongly focused 
on providing care interventions with only a minority primarily focused on the use of 
criminal actions. This is interesting for a country identified by Junger-Tas (2006) as 
having an Anglo-Saxon approach to youth justice – an emphasis on punishment and 
deterrence (see above). Sometimes the emphasis was on providing future prospects 
for young people, with the rare additional objective of working to address parental  
support  needs.  Intervention  was  often  initiated  via  a  final  warning  distributed  to 
members, mostly in the form of a (mayors’) letter and followed up by a personal 
interview. The police worked with partners (community, youth, street workers), mainly 
to target the supervision and monitoring of group movements and to hinder criminal 
leaders. However, the review found that the extent to which this was systematically 
carried out varied considerably. In fact, van Burik  et al. (2013) found that a unified 
and joint strategy was often lacking in the Netherlands and that multi-agency working 
was still  developing with too many different views on what was needed amongst 
partner agencies. However, they concluded that when invested heavily in, this bore 
results. The authors conclude that the Dutch Action Programme failed to meet its 
stated aims of tackling all criminal youth groups and notes that many Dutch cities do 
not have clearly defined plans (van Burik et al. 2013).
European  gang  policy  is  evidently  developing  at  different  rates.  The  countries 
covered in the ITACA research were found to be at varying stages of progress with 
regard to formulating policy, with Spain and France demonstrating some evidence of 
criminal justice responses to gangs. In Spain in 2005, the Ministry of Interior through 
the Secretary of  State,  established the ‘Police coordination and intervention plan 
against organized violent juvenile groups’. It was renewed in 2008 and replaced in 
2009 by the new Instruction of the State Secretary of Security, to boost and continue 
the aforementioned plan (Pozo et al. 2013). The objective of the plan is to coordinate 
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preventive and operational police forces activities, including: increasing intelligence 
on gangs through mapping and monitoring; cross-agency training on gang issues; 
increasing  the  contact  with  teachers,  parents  and  young  people;  setting  up  of 
government  advisory  groups  and  improving  collaboration  within  criminal  justice 
settings including prisons (Pozo et al., 2013).
Within France, the 8th March 2010 circular, set out action plans to implement local 
strategies to address gangs. The objectives were three-fold dependent on the type of  
gang: (1) Preventing crime and violence, (2) The prevention of public spaces for the 
instigation of riots and inter-gang clashes and (3) Prevention of organized trafficking. 
These objectives are to be met by the ‘gang shut down’ strategy, which relies on 
increasing the intelligence within areas exposed to the above problems by making 
use of real time intervention; strengthening legal responses by adapting local units; 
increased prevention and partnerships through youth awareness, jointly working with 
the  Youth  Judicial  Protection  Service;  developing  Local  Security  and  Crime 
Prevention Committees and partnership working with the national education system 
(see Cervantes and Marchand, 2013). 
The  ITACA  project  reports  that  Italy  does  not  have  any  anti-gang  legislation 
(Padovani et al., 2013). Although in 2003, the Italian government set up a Committee 
on ‘Juvenile Group Violence’, which sought to improve school activities and support 
health  education projects in order  to target  the problem (Menesini  and Modiano, 
2003). 
Anti-gang  legislation  in  Italy  was  reported  to  still  be  in  its  early  stages  but 
nevertheless, was reported to be ‘extremely promising’ (Padovani et al., 2013).  The 
report  found  that  there  are  no  clear  provisions  and  best  practices  regarding 
preventive  measure  and  law enforcement  strategies  concerning  gangs.  Juvenile 
justice  offices were found to  generally be  poorly organized and critiqued for  not 
providing  specific  training on gangs for  juvenile  justice  officers.   The report  also 
highlights a lack of integration between welfare and social protection systems and 
criminal  justice  in  establishing  a  gang  reduction  program  and  raised  concerns 
regarding a lack of specific budget allocations and an underestimation of advantages 
of developing a specific gang policy. 
As described earlier,  although the phenomenon of  juvenile  gangs has no official 
definition or data in Portugal, the professionals who deal with juvenile delinquency 
consider it a significant issue that needs urgent attention and answers. According to  
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such professionals, there are many problems in the Portuguese intervention policies 
concerning juvenile gangs. First, they consider that there is not a systemic policy 
toward  gangs.  A specific  problem  pointed  out  by  practitioners  is  the  failure  to 
consider mental health issues in formulating a gang response. Thus, they consider 
that although the laws which frame juvenile delinquency in Portugal  are positive, 
there is  much to  change and to  improve.  The few implemented actions  towards 
juvenile  delinquency  in  gangs  are  generally  considered  ineffective  and 
uncoordinated.  Nevertheless,  some  intervention  practices  are  named  as  good 
examples.  Working  with  the  youngsters  and  their  families  in  the  community,  for 
example in socially deprived areas where youngsters are at higher risk of becoming 
violent and participating in gangs’ delinquency, is seen as a positive practice. The 
“Programa Escolhas” is named by 23% of the practitioners as the most important 
programme carried out in Portugal with impact on the prevention and intervention in  
juvenile  delinquency  (Padovani  et  al.,  2013).  Implemented  in  2001,  it  includes 
several  small  projects  undertaken  in  “risk”  areas  throughout  the  country,  and 
continuously over time. It aims to prevent a wide range of social problems in specific 
territories, and is carried out by multidisciplinary teams involving the communities 
(Matos et al., 2013). 
Practitioners  point  as  problematic  the  lack  of  program  evaluation  practices  in 
Portugal. Negative evaluations are frequently rejected instead of being considered 
improvement opportunities. Recommendations include the need to create conditions 
for an evidence-based understanding of youth gangs in Portugal, namely through: 
(1) The promotion of public discussion about the phenomenon; (2) The creation of an 
operational definition of gang in order to gather official  statistics about it;  (3) The 
increasing cooperation with international institutions (Matos et al., 2013: 123).
Amongst the Scandinavian countries, it is evident that there are two distinct types of  
gangs as well as two discrete approaches to gangs. The first being the police led 
suppression approach, dealing in the main with biker gangs and organized crime 
(e.g.  Denmark’s  ‘Biker  Law’ and ‘Biker  Task Force’).  For  example,  Denmark and 
Norway,  both  now  have  specialist  police  departments:  the  Oslo  Police  District 
established theirs in 2009, whilst in Denmark, the National Center of Investigation 
(NCI) represents a national police effort against organized crime, including group-
related crime. Denmark’s  dedicated Biker Task Force,  set  up in 1996, has since 
changed to cover a broader range of group criminality that includes street gangs and 
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other organized crime groups. A further key piece of legislation was the 2002 Plan of 
Operations, which has been interpreted as subjecting gang members to increased 
surveillance (Cornils and Grave, 2004).  
Carlsson  and  Decker  (2005:  281) note,  “The  Scandinavian  intervention  diet 
represents a mixture of both suppression and social-intervention strategies”.  This 
approach  mirrors  the  welfare  oriented  characteristics  of  the  Scandinavian  youth 
justice  system.  This  mixture  is  clearly  illustrated  by  the  recently  developed 
Stockholm  Gang  Intervention  and  Prevention  Project  (SGIP).  SGIP  received 
significant European Union funding between 2009-2012 (EUR 1,181,000) with an 
objective “to prevent and deter youth from beginning criminal careers in street gangs 
and other criminal networks” (Rostami and Leinfelt, 2012: 9). They go onto make the 
bold claim that unlike other Scandinavian and wider European strategies, SGIP is 
based on “empirical findings and “best practices” (Rostami and Leinfelt, 2012: 91). 
The  strategy  incorporates  the  operational  PANTHER  Gang  Model  –  Preventive 
Analysis about Network Targets for a Holistic Enforcement Response. Both models 
are  based  on  a  holistic  approach,  incorporating  suppression,  intervention  and 
prevention.  In  assessing  the  PANTHER model,  Leinfelt  (2012:  183-184)  notes  a 
common flaw in police led gang interventions – the disregard of underlying issues 
and lack of understanding of the problem.  The solution, he argues, is to think more 
holistically, and to involve a wide range of external partners and stakeholders from 
an  early  stage.   He  also  notes  the  necessity  to  build  in  robust  evaluations  of 
interventions.  Indeed, the PANTHER project was independently evaluated by the 
University of Linnaeus (see Holgersson and Granér, 2012) who found that on the 
basis of the data made available, that only four of the project's 18 objectives had 
been  met,  with  a  further  two  objectives  described  as  ‘probably  been  met’ 
(Holgersson and Granér,  2012: 4).  Moreover,  the objectives met related to public 
engagement  rather  than  gang  suppression,  for  example,  the  hosting  of  two 
international gang conferences and public engagement such as media interviews. 
Carlsson and Decker (2005) provide a more detailed outlining of the Scandinavian 
response, documenting informal social control techniques – such as civilian security 
patrols  –  and  a  combination  of  social  control  and  social  opportunity  measures, 
including  youth  contracts,  multisystemic  therapy,  exit  parent  groups  and 
complimentary  methods.  As  we  indicated  above,  very  few,  if  any  of  these 
approaches have been rigorously evaluated and not all are targeted specifically at 
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youth  gangs.  Nonetheless,  they  are  important  to  note  as  they  demonstrate  the 
differing  approaches  to  ‘gang  intervention’  in  the  Scandinavian  countries. 
Suppression and social intervention play a role, and disagreement still exists over 
the  concept  of  youth  gangs.  These  two  approaches  represent  a  commitment  to 
tackling  organized  crime,  in  the  main  organized  biker  gangs  and  are  police-led 
approaches and the second, social preventative strategies aimed at youth groups – 
who may or may not be defined as gangs – whereby the police do not dominate 
preventative strategies.        
As Cornils and Greve (2004) have observed, gangs are ‘useful enemies’, facilitating 
the authorisation of broad policing powers that would otherwise have been refused. 
They recount how in the Danish experience, media driven public concern about first 
biker gangs and more recently, street gangs, have been utilised to bring in a range of  
legal amendments.  These have included the forfeit of assets (proceeds of organized 
crime),  possession  of  weapons  laws  carrying  a  maximum  penalty  of  six  years. 
Offences against witness/intimidating a witness and the ‘Biker Law’ (Act No. 907 of 
15 October 1996, rockerloven ) which, as Cornils and Greve (ʻ ʼ ibid) note, was passed 
through very quickly (after only one week of consultation) as a result of  concern 
around the biker gang war at that time. This law permitted the police to issue an 
exclusion order forbidding a person to enter or to be present at particular premises 
deemed to be used as a meeting place for gangs or where the location is deemed to 
be at risk of attack.  Failure to comply with the order carried a two-year prison tariff.  
A more contemporary example of  the rapidity or  ‘knee jerk reaction’ to  gangs in 
Europe  is  the  UK’s  Ending  Gang  and  Youth  Violence  Report.  This  gang  policy 
emerged in direct response to the English Riots of August 2011 and the programme 
of interventions was rolled out within three months of the riots occurring in November 
2011 (EGYV, 2011).   As we have argued previously (see Smithson  et  al. 2013), 
blaming  the  riots  (in  part)  on  gangs  contradicts  the  figures  collated  on  actual 
involvement of gangs, with figures varying dependent upon police force. Newburn et 
al. (2011) claim that original figures from the Home Office suggested that one in four 
of  those arrested in connection with the riots were gang members. In the Home 
Office (2011: 5) report, it states that 10 per cent of all arrestees were reported to be 
gang-affiliated, it acknowledges that gang involvement in the riots was minimal. We 
now turn to the UK as an illustration of the European transformation.  
The UK gang journey: From ‘no problem’ to ‘national priority’
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So far, we have sought to highlight differences in knowledge, policy and terminology 
yet what currently unites Europe, no matter the differences in opinion and responses 
to gangs is the ever-changing global environment within which these opinions and 
responses are taking place.  We are currently in the midst of  a global  recession, 
Europe like the rest of the world is tackling high levels of (youth) unemployment, 
deprivation and poverty levels are increasing, and the traditional welfare states of 
many European countries are evolving as austerity measures bed in. Yet the gang 
and the responses to it remain high on many political agendas. The UK provides a 
case in point,  in the aftermath of the English riots in 2011, Prime Minister David 
Cameron announced a ‘concerted all-out war on gangs and gang culture’ and that 
‘stamping out these gangs is a new national priority’ (Cameron, 2011). Subsequently, 
the UK developed its first national gang response – The Ending Gangs and Youth 
Violence Strategy (EGYV, 2011). Weitekamp (2001: 311-312) recounts how the UK 
Home Office declined an invitation to participate in the 1999 Eurogang workshop: 
“They  declared  that  they  had  no  such  problem  and  decided  therefore  not  to 
participate.”   From  ‘no  such  problem’ in  1999  to  ‘national  priority’  in  2011  is  a 
remarkable transformation by any standards.    
Youth  gangs  and  a  plethora  of  gang  policy  responses  dominate  contemporary 
discourse on British youth more noticeably than other European countries. As noted, 
the post-script to the August 2011 English riots led to the development of the UK’s  
first  national  gang  strategy –  ‘Ending  Gangs  and  Youth  Violence’ (EGYV,  2011) 
based  on  a  five-point  principle  of  Providing  support;  Prevention;  Pathways  out; 
Punishment  and  enforcement;  and  Partnership  Working. In  the  UK,  political 
resistance  to  the  gang  label  began  to  change  in  response  to  a  series  of  fatal 
incidents  across  England  involving  young  males.  This  latest  gang  policy  was 
preceded by a call from the previous Prime Minister, Tony Blair, to hold the first ‘gang 
summit’ meeting at Downing Street in February 2007. Since this seminal event, we 
have witnessed a raft of new policy measures and guidance aimed at addressing 
violent  youth  gangs  in  the  UK.  By the  end of  2007,  the  UK had  witnessed the 
introduction of US inspired specialist  gangs and firearms units in large UK cities; 
weapon carrying and knife  and gun related offences became the next  cause for 
concern. The Tackling Gangs Action Plan (TGAP) was introduced in 2007 within four 
of England’s largest cities: London, Manchester, Birmingham and Liverpool. These 
cities were selected to form the TGAP, a six-month initiative to target and reduce 
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youth violence, particularly gang-related firearm offences (Home Office, 2008), as 
they  were  found  to  have  the  highest  levels  of  firearms  offences  per  head  of 
population (Dawson, 2008).  Each TGAP city now includes both US styled dedicated 
gang/firearm units within their police forces and Boston Ceasefire influenced multi-
agency responses to the ‘gang problem’ (e.g. ‘MAGU’ (Multi-Agency Gang Unit) in 
Birmingham and ‘IGMU’ (Integrated Gang Management Unit) in Manchester).  Many 
cities now have local authority Violent Gang Boards and legislation was passed to 
introduce  US styled  gang  injunctions  in  the  2009  Policing  and  Crime Act.   The 
escalation  of  UK  gang  discourse  and  subsequent  policy  responses  can  be 
comprehended in the timeline below. 
Gang  policy  makers  in  the  United  States  can  draw  on  a  substantive  evidence  base 
stretching  back  to  the  early  1960s.  This  body  of  work  includes  numerous  in-depth 
ethnographies through to large scale, nationally representative surveys. They can draw on a 
significant number of academics who are internationally regarded as ‘gang experts’, each 
with several decades of knowledge to draw upon. In stark contrast, UK academic research is 
still in its infancy, the picture is still emerging and is clearly lacking several pieces of the 
jigsaw.  What we have begun to witness since the turn of the twenty-first  century are a 
handful of studies that have sought to explore the notion of the ‘youth street gang’.  These 
studies have had a primary focus of elucidating the existence of US style gangs in the UK 
and documenting their existence, structure and size. The evidence paints a mixed picture, 
full of contradictions and competing narratives.  Alexander’s (2000) ethnographic study into a 
South Asian gang for example, found no evidence of gangs in East London and concluded 
that  the  term  ‘gang’  was  stigmatising  and  damaging  to  ethnic  minority  communities. 
Likewise,  Kintrea  et  al. (2008),  who conducted research in  10 cities across Britain,  was 
reluctant to engage in gang terminology, preferring to discuss evidence of territoriality.  In 
contrast, a small body of London based gang research has emerged that seemed to have 
little problem identifying youth street gangs and gang members.  Most noticeable perhaps 
has been the work of Pitts (2008) and more recently, the ethnographic research of Densley 
(2011,  2013).  The  work  of  Pitts  in  particular,  presents  a  picture  of  highly  structured 
‘supergangs’ whose primary focus is drug dealing.  
After a period of denial, we suggest that such concentration on youth gangs as a 
‘national priority’ represents an over-reaction to gangs. We argue that much youth 
activity  has  been  (re)framed  as  gang-related  activity  and  as  a  consequence 
escalates  behaviour  to  a  higher  level  of  risk,  which  in  turn  intensifies  levels  of 
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surveillance and justifies more stringent forms of intervention and monitoring (see 
Ralphs  et al.  2009).  Strategies are devised and developed which aim to reduce, 
contain  or  manage  the  risk  posed  by  problematic  individuals  and  populations 
(Garland 2001; Feeley and Simon 1992).
In common with other European countries discussed here, despite the introduction of 
a  raft  of  gang  policy  and  interventions,  the  UK  has  limited  understanding  and 
evaluation of gang interventions and of what works (Shute  et al., 2012).  This was 
made explicit  in a recent review of London based initiatives to tackle gangs that  
found few had attempted to evaluate the effect of their work on levels of gang and 
violent behaviour. The review noted that further data such as offending rates would 
be  required  to  ascertain  success  but  unfortunately,  this  data  and  the  resources 
required to carry out more elaborate research are not always available or within the 
scope of the charities and organisations who work with gangs and young people. 
The review concluded that rather than throw more ‘gang money’ at the problem, a  
good starting point would be to encourage the right conditions for an evidence-based 
approach to inform future decisions (Project Oracle, 2013).  In a more recent article,  
Shute and Medina (2014: 1) launch a scathing attack on the EGYV strategy, ‘we find 
a government wasting £10 million on untheorised, unevidenced, and unevaluated 
‘activity’ that risks reifying the very problem it claims to fear. The national obsession 
and current responses to gangs in the UK are based upon ill-thought out and rushed 
through  short-term  interventions  and  programmes  (local  authorities  in  receipt  of 
EGYV funding had until  March 2013 to spend it  – the majority of  authorities not 
receiving the monies until summer of 2012).  Iain Duncan Smith stated himself, “It is 
unthinkable that a full and proper study of such a devastating problem has not been 
undertaken prior to setting policy” (Centre for Social Justice, 2009: 9). Fast forward 
two  years  to  2011,  and  he  endorsed  a  national  strategy  conceived  over  three 
months, not the ‘full and proper’ study he was referring to.       
Conclusion
Discussing US programs and policies of gang intervention, Klein (2001: 9) notes: 
“They range from social services for individual youth to special anti-gang legislation 
to crack down on and incarcerate gang members at greater levels than non-gang 
offenders. In between are street worker programs, organizational change, community 
empowerment  and police suppression programs.  [.  .  .]  Perhaps the most  striking 
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comment, however, is the almost complete lack of scientifically acceptable evidence 
for the success of any one of them, and the enormous complexity of attempting to 
implement a comprehensive approach involving a wide range of these approaches.”  
Sadly, over a decade on, in a European context, the same range of interventions are evident 
and conclusions reached.  What might we surmise about the direction of gang policy and 
practice across European countries over the last decade? Unfortunately, it is our belief that 
European countries have failed to learn the lessons offered by US academics concerning the 
requirement of having well-defined gang labels and evidence-based interventions. Rather, it 
has often taken the indolent and perilous path of clutching on to US style interventions – this 
despite the largely unproven (or at best merely promising) evidence of intervention success 
in  the  US.   Unfortunately,  this  growing  mass  of  US-inspired  gang-focused  policy  and 
interventions is lacking rigorous academic analysis and evaluation and, as we have begun to 
outline here, where a level of evaluation has taken place such as the ITACA project, the 
Netherlands and Sweden (see ITACA, 2013; van Burik et al., 2013; Holgersson and Granér, 
2012),  the evidence is  at  best  inconclusive.  In  spite  of  the  paucity of  empirically  based 
research, the alacrity of criminal justice developments in responding to and tackling the gang 
problem in Europe shows no signs of waning.  
The broad trend has been the setting up of US inspired dedicated policing units, variants of 
US gang injunctions and latterly, following the realisation that one cannot simply police their 
way out of gangs, multi-agency approaches with greater emphasis on welfare provision and 
support around desistance.  Nevertheless, criminal justice interventions still  dominate.  A 
consistent theme emerges amongst the countries represented by the ITACA project (Italy, 
Portugal,  Spain  and  France)  and  the  Scandinavian  countries  of  Sweden,  Denmark  and 
Norway and this is the need for an integrated approach to gang policy. The UK and the 
Netherlands appear further down the road of multi-agency gang policy. The concept of the 
gang and concerns that surround it have led to unprecedented official gang discourse and a 
wide  range  of  European  policy  responses  elevating  gang  interventions  as  high  on  the 
national policy agenda. 
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i The recently concluded European project ITACA ‘Interaction of different subjects Towards 
A strategic Common Answer concerning juvenile gangs’ was funded for 333,000 Euro’s by 
the European Union’s Daphne III Programme which aims to prevent and combat violence 
against children, young people and women.  The overall goal of ITACA was to implement a  
European  multi-level  analysis  of  ‘juvenile  gangs’  in  order  to  create  a  picture  of  the 
phenomenon,  making  it  possible  to  understand  it  and  to  identify  key  elements  and 
recommendations for putting into place/creating practices and actions aimed at treatment 
and prevention.  To this end, research was conducted with partner institutions across six 
European countries – Belgium, France,  Italy,  Portugal,  Spain and the United Kingdom 
-between March 2011 and February 2013.
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